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THE ROLE OF HUMAN DIGNITY IN THE ASSESSMENT OF FAIR 
COMPENSATION FOR UNFAIR DISMISSALS 
 
       S Vettori*  
 1 Introduction 
 
South African labour law is concerned with the attainment of fairness for both the 
employer and the employee.1 In weighing up the interests of the respective parties it 
is of paramount importance to ensure that a delicate balance is achieved so as to 
give credence not only to commercial reality but also to a respect for human dignity. 
Consequently, when a court has to assess the amount of compensation to award for 
the unfair conduct of the employer, which usually takes the form of an unfair labour 
practice or an unfair dismissal, it must achieve a balance between the sometimes 
competing policy considerations of human dignity and equality on the one hand and 
commercial reality on the other hand. These rights are often the competing rights of 
the employer on the one hand and the employee on the other.  
 
The environment within which the world of work operates has at its core a free 
enterprise economy. Ultimately, an employer should generally not be penalised to 
the extent that it is crippled and unable to continue operating. The essence of the 
employment relationship is thus explained: 
 
The relationship is a mercantile one to the core. The employer hires the employee 
because he wants a job done and is prepared to pay accordingly; the employee 
agrees to the hire because he wants the payment and is prepared to do the job to 
get it; and the exchange continues until one or other no longer gets the commercial 
advantage he wants… Financial gain, then, is the mainspring of the employment 
relationship, just as much as it is the mainspring of a sale or a lease. The legislature 
sees nothing wrong with this. On the contrary, it encourages it, in the belief that our 
interests are best served by the free enterprise system it manifests. One is quick to 
assume, therefore that the unfair labour practice jurisdiction is not meant to restrict 
the proper pursuit of pecuniary gain.2 
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This reality is borne out by the fact, for example, that in terms of the Labour 
Relations Act3 (hereinafter the "LRA") an employer's "operational requirements"4 are 
considered to be an acceptable reason to dismiss employees.5  
 
Although the purpose of a contract of employment is mainly commercial, the contract 
of employment is not perceived as a purely commercial contract. There is an aspect 
which is strongly linked to an individual's sense of identity, dignity and humanity. A 
person's sense of self worth is often linked to his or her contributing meaningfully to 
society. This contribution is very often dependent on a person's job or career. 
Furthermore, with an employment contract, unlike other commercial contracts such 
as a contract of sale, there is a continuous relationship between the contracting 
parties. This relationship often endures for an unspecified time in terms of the 
contract. As a result of these factors the employment relationship has undergone a 
transformation in the last few decades. It is now perceived by many to be primarily a 
relational relationship as opposed to a purely commercial relationship.6 As such the 
employer is obliged to act in a reasonable or fair manner towards its employees, 
especially in the light of the constitutionally protected right to dignity. The protection 
of fundamental freedoms such as gender equality, the right to dignity and the 
prevention of harassment at the workplace form a cornerstone of South African 
labour legislation.7  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
1  Section 23(1) Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 provides that everyone has the 
right to fair labour practices. 
2  Brassey et al New Labour Law 65. 
3  Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (LRA). 
4  Section 213 of the LRA defines operational requirements as "economical, technological, 
structural or similar needs of the employer". 
5  Section 189 LRA. 
6  Lord Slynn  of Hadley in Spring v Guardian Assurance Plc 1995 2 AC 296, 335B stated: "the 
changes which have taken place in the employer - employee relationship, with far greater duties 
imposed on the employer than in the past, whether by statute or by judicial decision, to care for 
the physical, financial and even psychological welfare of the employee". See Johnson v Unisys 
Ltd 2001 IRLR 279 para 20. After referring to this statement Lord Steyn in Johnson v Unisys Ltd 
2001 IRLR 279 para 20 concluded: "It is no longer right to equate a contract of employment with 
commercial contracts. One possible way of describing a contract of employment in modern terms 
is as a relational contract". 
7  Per Nicholson JA in Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union v Glass & 
Aluminium 2000 CC 2002 23 ILJ 695 (LAC) para 48. 
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It is argued in this article that in ascertaining what constitutes appropriate or fair 
compensation8 for an unfair dismissal, the underlying reality that labour law operates 
in a free enterprise system must be given cognisance to, but not at the expense of a 
person's right to dignity. In short therefore, a court or tribunal should consider any 
infringement on a person's right to dignity when determining what compensation will 
be fair in a given set of circumstances. 
 
2 Compensation as a remedy for unfair dismissal 
 
In giving content to the constitutional right to fair labour practices contained in 
section 23(1) of the Constitution,9 the LRA inter alia provides that every employee 
has the right not to be unfairly dismissed.10 In terms of section 193(2) of the LRA the 
Labour Court or an arbitrator must require the employer to re-instate or re-employ 
the employee whose dismissal was substantively unfair unless certain exceptions 
apply. One of the exceptions arises when "it is not reasonably practicable for the 
employer to re-instate or re-employ the employee".11 Another exception arises when 
"the circumstances surrounding the dismissal are such that a continued employment 
relationship would be intolerable".12 Therefore, when it is not appropriate or practical 
in the circumstances to enforce the primary remedy for an unfair dismissal, namely a 
re-employment order, the judge or arbitrator must make an award for compensation. 
The remedy of compensation and the appropriate amount thereof is the focus of this 
article. 
 
Section 194 of the LRA provides: 
 
1) The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is found to be 
unfair either because the employer did not prove that the reason for dismissal was a 
fair reason relating to the employee's conduct or capacity or the employer's 
operational requirements or the employer did not follow a fair procedure, or both, 
must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but may not be more than the 
                                                          
8  Other remedies for unfair dismissal such as re-instatement or re-employment are beyond the 
scope of this article. 
9  It was previously also numbered as if it were an Act of Parliament, Act 108 of 1996. 
10  Section 185 LRA. 
11  Section 193(2)(c) LRA. 
12  Section 193(2)(b) LRA. 
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equivalent of 12 months' remuneration calculated at the employee's rate of 
remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
 
(3)The compensation awarded to an employee whose dismissal is automatically 
unfair must be just and equitable in all the circumstances, but not more than the 
equivalent of 24 months' remuneration calculated at the employee's rate of 
remuneration on the date of dismissal. 
 
Unlike the present LRA, the 1956 Labour Relations Act13 placed no cap on the 
amount of compensation an employee who was unfairly dismissed could be 
awarded. The previous Industrial Court had an unfettered discretion in terms of the 
said amount.14 In terms of the present LRA, the legislature placed a cap on the 
amount that can be awarded and thus the discretion of arbitrators and judges has 
been limited. Arguments in the interests of business viability and socio-economic 
policy can be put forward in support of such a cap. In the words of Pillay J:  
 
The need for certainty and limitation of compensation claims in labour disputes is a 
matter of socio-economic policy. Furthermore, the elevation of labour rights as a 
socio-economic constitutional right re-enforces the need to balance the various 
competing interests in labour disputes.15 
 
It may be possible, albeit in very limited circumstances, to base a claim for unfair 
dismissal on the common law and thereby circumvent the caps on compensation 
provided in terms of the LRA. There are substantial differences regarding the onus of 
proof of both the employer and the employee for a constructive dismissal based on 
the common law and one based on the LRA.16 Given these differences it is possible 
that circumstances may arise where the employee may sue the employer on the 
basis of the common law constructive dismissal, despite the fact that constructive 
dismissal is provided for in terms of section 186(1)(e) of the LRA.17 Constructive 
dismissal is important in the context of impairment to one's dignity, because it often 
                                                          
13  Labour Relations Act 28 of 1956. 
14  Grogan Workplace Law 177. 
15   Parry v Astral Operations Ltd 2005 10 BLLR 989 (LC) para 100. 
16  For a detailed discussion of this, which is beyond the scope of this article, see Vettori 2011 Stell 
LR 182-185. 
17  See South African Maritime Safety Authority and Fafie Fortune Mckenzie 2010 31 ILJ 529 (SCA) 
para 16, where the court, quoting Da Silva v Coutinho 1971 3 SA 123 (A) 135, stated that where 
a right is protected by means of statute: "We must look at the provisions of the Act in question, its 
scope and its object, and see whether it was intended when laying down a special remedy that 
that special remedy should exclude ordinary remedies. In other words, we have no right to 
assume, merely from the fact that a special remedy is laid down in a statute as a remedy for a 
breach of a right given under statute, that other remedies are necessarily excluded". 
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happens that an employer's acts or omissions that render a person's work situation 
intolerable also impair that person's right to dignity. 
 
However, judges and arbitrators still have discretion to award an amount of 
compensation that is "just and equitable in all the circumstances" within the limited 
amount. The LRA does not define what is meant by "just and equitable" in this 
context. This discretion must be exercised in a judicial manner. The court decisions 
demonstrate inconsistencies regarding the factors that must be considered in 
determining the quantum, and consequently there are also inconsistencies regarding 
the amounts awarded.18 Generally the monetary compensation is perceived to be a 
solatium.19 This is especially the case for procedurally unfair dismissals.20 As such, it 
may not be necessary to prove any loss or damages since the compensation is a 
solace for the loss or infringement of a right.21 Nevertheless, the courts have still, in 
unfair dismissal claims in terms of the LRA, considered the damages or loss actually 
suffered by the dismissed employee as a result of the dismissal in determining the 
amount of compensation payable,22 as is the case in breach of contract or a delictual 
claim. For example in Le Monde Luggage CC t/a Pakwells Petje v Dunn23Jappie AJA 
concluded that in the case of an unfair dismissal the compensation is: 
 
… payment to offset the financial loss which has resulted from a wrongful act. The 
primary enquiry for a court is to determine the extent of that loss, taking into 
                                                          
18  See Van Niekerk Unfair Dismissal 128. 
19  Claassen Dictionary defines solatium in the words of RD Claassen (Judge of the High Court of 
South Africa) as follows: "(1) Comfort. Thus by the strict Roman law women could not adopt 
children, but the emperor allowed them this privilege by way of comfort for the loss of their own 
children (ad solatium liberorum amissorum, Inst 1.11.10). (2) Payment or compensation made 
either voluntarily or upon judicial decree for loss sustained or injury suffered". 
20  In Alpha Plant and Services (Pty) Ltd v Simmonds 2001 22 ILJ 359 (LAC) para 41, the court 
stated: "The compensation for the wrong in failing to give effect to an employee's right to a fair 
procedure is not based on patrimonial or actual loss. It is in the nature of a solatium for the loss 
of the right, and is punitive to the extent that an employer (who breached the right) must pay a 
fixed penalty for causing that loss. In the normal course a legal wrong done by one person to 
another deserves some form of redress". 
21  See Johnson & Johnson v CWIU 1998 12 BLLR 1209 (LAC), where the court held that 
compensation included payment in solace for the loss of a right. Also in National Union of 
Metalworkers of SA v Precious Metal Chains (Pty) Ltd 1997 18 ILJ 1346 (LC) 1354 H-J, the 
Labour Court held that since such compensation is not in the form of damages, the employee 
need not prove his or her losses. 
22  In Chothia v Hall Longmore & Co (Pty) Ltd (1997) 18 ILJ 1090 (LC) it was held that 
"compensation" in terms of s 194 of the LRA should be given its ordinary meaning as "the value 
estimated in money of something lost". 
23  Le Monde Luggage CC t/a Pakwells Petje v Dunn 2007 28 ILJ 2246 (LAC) para 30. 
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account the nature of the unfair dismissal and hence the scope of the wrongful act 
on the part of the employer. This court has been careful to ensure that the purpose 
of the compensation is to make good the employee's loss and not to punish the 
employer.24  
 
Again, in a recent decision the Supreme Court of Appeal pointed to "a long line of 
cases" where it was held that that compensation for dismissal is limited to 
compensation for financial loss and excludes punitive damages.25 
 
Payment for "financial loss which has resulted from a wrongful act" seems akin to a 
delictual claim as opposed to a claim for breach of contract. This observation was 
made in Alert Employment Personnel (Pty) Ltd v Leech.26 The court then referred to 
Trotman v Edwick27 where Van den Heever distinguished between damages in 
contract and damages in delict as follows: 
 
A litigant who sues on contract sues to have his bargain or its equivalent in money 
or in money in kind. The litigant who sues on delict sues to recover the loss which 
he had sustained because of the wrongful conduct of another, in other words that 
the amount by which his patrimony has been diminished by such conduct should be 
restored to him. 
 
There is, however,  also authority for the proposition that compensation should be in 
line with the damages for a breach of contract in that the aggrieved employee should 
be placed in the same position had the contract not been breached. In the case of 
Nkopane v Independent Electoral Commission28 the Labour Court found it 
inappropriate to award more than what the employee would have earned had the 
fixed term contract not been prematurely terminated by the employer. 
 
                                                          
24  The Labour Appeal Court in Alert Employment Personnel (Pty) Ltd v Leech 1993 14 ILJ 655 
(LAC) at 661 held that the intention of the legislature with regard to the Labour Relations Act 28 
of 1956 was to compensate for the loss caused and this was more akin to a delictual claim than 
to a claim based on breach of contract. 
25  Rawlins C Dr DC Kemp t/a Centralmed (Unreported Supreme Court of Appeal Case No 483/09, 
2010) para 2. 
26  Rawlins C Dr DC Kemp t/a Centralmed (Unreported Supreme Court of Appeal Case No 483/09, 
2010) para 2. 
27  Trotman v Edwick 1951 1 SA 443 (A) 449B-C. 
28  Nkopane v Independent Electoral Commission 2007 28 ILJ 670 (LC) para 80. 
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The Labour Appeal Court in Ferodo (Pty) Ltd v De Ruiter,29  under the previous 
labour law dispensation prior to the enactment of the present LRA, set out the 
following guidelines for the determination of the quantum of damages in the case of 
an unfair dismissal: 
 
(a) There must be evidence of actual financial loss suffered by the person claiming 
compensation; 
(b) There must be proof that the loss was caused by the unfair labour practice; 
(c) The loss must be foreseeable, i.e. not too remote or speculative; 
(d) The award must endeavour to place the applicant in monetary terms in that 
position in which he would have been had the unfair labour practice not been 
committed;  
(e) In making the award the court must be guided by what is reasonable and fair in 
the circumstances; 
(f) There is a duty on the employee (if he is seeking compensation) to mitigate his 
damages by taking all reasonable steps to acquire alternative employment. Even 
though the Labour Appeal Court was dealing with the issue of compensation for an 
unfair dismissal under the 1956 Labour Relations Act, these guidelines have been 
considered apposite even under the current labour regime. 
 
In Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots,30 Nicholson JA, following 
English law, listed basically the same guidelines for consideration in determining the 
quantum of an award for compensation for unfair dismissal.31  
 
Other factors the courts have taken into account in determining what is fair and 
equitable in the context of compensation for unfair dismissal include the length of 
service of the dismissed employee, the manner in which the dismissal was effected, 
and the fact that the employer was a small enterprise.32 However, despite dicta to 
the effect that compensation should not be punitive33 even in the case of an 
automatically unfair dismissal,34 the courts have also exhibited a willingness to award 
punitive damages. This is especially but not necessarily the case when the courts 
are faced with an automatically unfair dismissal.35 For example, in Chemical Energy 
                                                          
29  Ferodo (Pty) Ltd v De Ruiter 1993 14 ILJ 974 (LAC) 981 C-G. 
30  Pretoria Society for the Care of the Retarded v Loots 1997 18 ILJ 981 (LAC) 990 A-B. 
31  These were the factors referred to by Combrinck J in Ferodo (Pty) Ltd v De Ruiter 1993 14 ILJ 
974 (LAC) 981 C-G. 
32  Lukie v Rural Alliance CC t/a Rural Development Specialist 2004 25 ILJ 1445 (LC) para 19. 
33  Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 1997 3 SA 786 (CC). 
34  See Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd v Commission for Conciliation, Mediation & Arbitration 2007 28 
ILJ 2246 (LAC) para 30. 
35  Section 187 of the LRA provides inter alia that a dismissal is automatically unfair if the reason for 
the dismissal is that the "employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or 
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Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union v Glass & Aluminium 2000 CC36 
Nicholson JA stated that a dismissal which is automatically unfair ... 
 
...strikes at the essence of the values which form the foundations of our new 
democratic society as enunciated in the Constitution. It is a dismissal that 
undermines the fundamental values that the labour relations community in our 
country depends on to regulate its very existence. Accordingly such a dismissal 
deserves to be dealt with in a manner that gives due weight to the seriousness of 
the unfairness to which the employee so dismissed has been 
subjected...Accordingly there must be a punitive element in the consideration of 
compensation. 
 
In similar vein in Parry v Astral Operations Ltd37 Pillay J stated: 
 
So reprehensible has the respondent's conduct been, so gross the violation of the 
applicant's dignity that, despite the applicant being awarded contractual damages 
under section 195 of the LRA, he should also be awarded the maximum 
compensation allowed under section 194 of the LRA.38 
 
The cap on compensation for automatically unfair dismissals is double that of 
"ordinary dismissals", namely 24 months' salary as opposed to 12 months salary.39 
Perhaps this could be construed as an intention on the part of the legislature to 
introduce a punitive element in the amount of compensation awarded for 
automatically unfair dismissals since these reasons for dismissal seem to be morally 
reprehensible and repulsive to our sense of justice. 
 
In Minister for Justice & Constitutional Development v Tshishonga40 the Labour 
Appeal Court referred to case law relating to an award for solatium in terms of the 
actio injuriarum for guidance in what would constitute just and equitable 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
indirectly, on any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political opinion, 
culture, language, marital status or family responsibility". 
36  Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union v Glass & Aluminium 2000 CC 
2002 23 ILJ 695 (LAC) para 48-50. 
37  Parry v Astral Operations Ltd 2005]10 BLLR 989 (LC) para 137. 
38  See also Lukie v Rural Alliance CC t/a Rural Development Specialist 2004 25 ILJ 1445 (LC) para 
19, where the Labour Court found it unacceptable that some employers dismiss employees on 
the basis of pregnancy despite the advancement of women's rights and the protection of 
fundamental rights in terms of the Constitution. 
39  Section 194(3) LRA. 
40  Minister for Justice & Constitutional Development v Tshishonga 2009 9 BLLR 862 (LAC).                                    
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compensation for non-patrimonial loss in the context of an unfair labour practice.41 
The award in these cases serves to rectify an attack on one's dignity. The court 
concluded that relevant factors in determining the quantum of damages in these 
cases included but were not limited to: 
 
…the nature and seriousness of the iniuria, the circumstances in which the 
infringement took place, the behavior of the defendant (especially whether the 
motive was honorable or malicious), the extent of the plaintiff's humiliation or 
distress , the abuse of the relationship between the parties, and the attitude of the 
defendant after the iniuria had taken place…     
                
The above discussion of the case law illustrates that the determination of the 
quantum of compensation and the determination of what is "just and equitable" 
compensation in terms of the LRA in the case of an unfair dismissal are not exact 
sciences. There are conflicting decisions regarding whether or not there should be a 
punitive element and also whether the compensation should be akin to 
compensation for a breach of contract or for a delictual claim. The weight of authority 
seems to lie with the conclusion that the compensation awarded is akin to a delictual 
claim and that there should not be a punitive element, except perhaps in the case of 
automatically unfair dismissals. In terms of section 193(2) of the LRA the Labour 
Court or an arbitrator must require the employer to re-instate or re-employ the 
employee whose dismissal was substantively unfair unless certain exceptions apply. 
The primary remedy, namely a re-employment order, obviously does not include any 
compensation for non-pecuniary loss, or punitive damages. It could be argued that it 
follows therefore that the secondary remedy, namely compensation, also excludes 
non-pecuniary losses such as injury to feelings, and punitive damages.  
 
3   Dismissals and a breach of the right to dignity 
 
3.1  The Constitution and the right to dignity 
 
Section 9(3) of the Constitution provides that no person may unfairly discriminate 
against anyone on one or more grounds including race, sex, ethnic or social origin et 
                                                          
41  Minister for Justice & Constitutional Development v Tshishonga 2009 9 BLLR 862 (LAC)                                   
para 18. 
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cetera. Section 10 provides that "everyone has the right to have their dignity 
respected and protected". These fundamental rights must be given cognisance to in 
interpreting provisions not only in national legislation but also in developing and 
interpreting the common law. This is so, as section 39(1)(a) enjoins courts to 
promote the "values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom" and section 39(2) enjoins the courts to develop the 
common law in line with and giving effect to the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of 
Rights. Furthermore section 173 of the Constitution provides the High Courts, the 
Supreme Court of Appeal and the Constitutional Court with inherent jurisdiction to 
develop the common law, "taking into account the interests of justice".  
 
Since a dismissal can also entail a breach of a person's right to dignity or unfair 
discrimination, the amount of compensation awarded in these instances must reflect 
these constitutional imperatives so that a person's fundamental rights to dignity and 
equality can be upheld and protected. The relevance of these constitutional 
imperatives with regard to determining what amount of compensation to award for an 
unfair dismissal is that an emphasis on the importance of preserving human dignity 
when interpreting both the common law and legislation is achieved. In essence, 
when a dismissal also impairs a person's right to dignity, both labour rights and 
constitutional rights are impaired by the same conduct. 
 
3.2    More than one claim based on the same set of facts 
 
There may be instances where a person's right to dignity was severely impaired as a 
result of his or her dismissal. If such a person bases his/her claim on the LRA unfair 
dismissal provisions he/she may not be adequately compensated for injury to dignity 
since the LRA places a cap on the amount of compensation that can be awarded in 
cases of an unfair dismissal. In these circumstances it is possible that an employee 
can claim compensation for an unfair dismissal in terms of the LRA and in addition 
claim compensation for injury to feelings or discrimination either in terms of the 
common law or the Employment Equity Act42 (hereinafter the EEA) as a result of the 
                                                          
42  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 (EEA). 
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dismissal. In other words, there can be more than one cause of action based on the 
same set of facts. 
 
Very often, in the course of a dismissal an employee also suffers injury to feelings or 
an infringement of the right to dignity. This is usually the case where there has been 
a constructive dismissal43 or a breach of the implied term of trust and confidence.44 
Section 195 of the LRA provides that "an order or award of compensation made in 
terms of this Chapter is in addition to, and not a substitute for, any other amount to 
which the employee is entitled in terms of any law, collective agreement or contract 
of employment". In Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security45 the Constitutional Court 
held that section 157(2) of the LRA allows the High Court to adjudicate issues arising 
from employment if the Labour Court does not have exclusive jurisdiction in respect 
of such issues. In Ntsabo v Real Security CC46 the Labour Court awarded the 
employee the maximum compensation for constructive dismissal in terms of the 
LRA, namely 12 months' salary, in addition to damages arising from the sexual 
harassment of the employee which resulted in the constructive dismissal, in terms of 
the provisions of the Employment Equity Act47 (the EEA).48 In the light of this, the 
possibility of claiming compensation in terms of the EEA, or in terms of the common 
law in addition to a claim for unfair dismissal in terms of the LRA based on the same 
                                                          
43  Section 186(1)(e) LRA. 
44  The notion of "constructive dismissal" is derived from English law. Cameron JA in Murray v 
Minister of Defence 2009 3 SA 130 (SCA) para 8 explains: "The term used in English law 
'constructive dismissal' (where 'constructive' signifies something the law deems to exist for 
reasons of fairness and justice, such as notice, knowledge, trust, desertion), has become well 
established in our law. In employment law, constructive dismissal represents a victory for 
substance over form. Its essence is that although the employee resigns, the causal responsibility 
for the termination of service is recognised as the employer's unacceptable conduct, and the 
latter therefore remains responsible for the consequences". For a detailed discussion of the 
implied term of trust and confidence see Vettori 2011 Stell LR 179-181. 
45  Gcaba v Minister of Safety & Security (Unreported Constitutional Court Case No T64/08, 7 
October 2009) para 73. 
46  Ntsabo v Real Security CC 2003 4 ILJ 2341 (LC). 
47  Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998. 
48  See also Dial Tech CC v Hudson 2007 28 ILJ 1237 (LC) para 63 where the court stated: "Whilst 
the cause of action in both the constructive dismissal and the harassment cases may arise from 
the same set of facts and circumstances, the remedies are located in different statutes. The 
remedies for constructive dismissal and unfair discrimination are found in the LRA and EEA 
respectively". The court therefore concluded that the employee was entitled to pursue a claim 
based on constructive dismissal in terms of the LRA in addition to one based on unfair 
discrimination in terms of the EEA even though both causes of action were given rise to by the 
same set of facts. This approach was followed in Ditsamai v Gauteng Shared Services Centre 
2009 5 BLLR 456 (LC). 
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set of facts will be discussed. The discussion will be limited to instances where the 
employee's dignity was impaired as a result of discrimination or harassment. In such 
instances the employee could claim that he/she was constructively dismissed.  
 
3.2.1 The common law duty of care 
 
Every employer has the common law duty to take reasonable care of an employee's 
safety. The breach of the duty of care can also take the form of an omission.49 
Brassey states: 
 
Since employers can be held liable for omissions, employers can be liable for failing 
to prevent people, such as suppliers, customers or employees, from causing their 
employees harm. They are likely to be held liable if they provided the opportunity or 
conditions for the injurious act or had the power to prevent it.50 
 
Breach of this duty occurs if the employer fails to guard against injury or harm in 
circumstances where a reasonable person would have foreseen the likelihood of 
injury or harm.51   
 
In Media 24 Ltd v Grobler52 the Supreme Court of Appeal held that it is "well settled" 
that employers owe their employees a duty to take reasonable care of their safety.53  
The court expressed the opinion that this duty is not confined to protecting 
employees from physical harm, but includes a duty to protect employees from 
psychological harm.54 The court found that the legal convictions of the community 
required an employer to take reasonable steps to protect its employees against acts 
                                                          
49  See Brassey Employment and Labour Law vol 1 E4:29. 
50  Brassey Employment and Labour Law vol 1 E4:30. 
51  Brassey Employment and Labour Law vol 1 E4:30-31. 
52  Media 24 Ltd v Grobler 2005 26 ILJ 1007 (SCA). 
53  See Brassey Employment and Labour Law vol 1 E4:19-49. 
54  Media 24 Ltd v Grobler 2005 26 ILJ 1007 (SCA) para 65.  
55  Difficulty arises in the application of what constitutes "the course and scope of employment". See 
in this regard Feldman (Pty) Ltd v Mall 1945 AD 733 774; Viljoen v Smith 1997 1 SA 309 (A) 
315D-317A; Minister of Safety and Security Services v Jordaan t/a Andre Jordaan Transport 
2000 4 SA 21 (SCA) para 5; Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Japmoco BK h/a Status 
Motors 2002 5 SA 649 (SCA) paras 11-16 and Minister van Veiligheid en Sekuriteit v Phoebus 
Appollo Aviation BK 2002 5 SA 475 (SCA) paras 8-18. See also K v Minister of Safety and 
Security 2005 3 All SA 519 (SCA) and K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 8 BLLR 749 
(CC). 
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of sexual harassment of other employees. Failure to do so would result in employers 
having to pay compensation to the victim of such sexual harassment. 
 
The constitutional imperatives discussed above may have the effect of increasing the 
ambit of the common law duty of employers to take reasonable care of and to protect 
employees from physical and psychological harm arising from harassment, 
stigmatisation and discrimination at the workplace. This in turn may result in higher 
awards of compensation where a person's dignity is impaired in the course of an 
unfair constructive dismissal. 
 
3.2.2  The vicarious liability of the employer 
 
In terms of common law vicarious liability of the employer, an employer will be held 
vicariously liable for a delict committed by an employee if it is committed by the 
employee in the course and scope of his or her employment.55 This delictual act 
could result in the impairment of the dignity of another person. If such an impairment 
is so severe as to render a person's work situation intolerable, it could amount to a 
constructive dismissal. As discussed above, this would violate the right not to be 
unfairly dismissed and the right not to be unfairly discriminated against and to have 
one's dignity impaired. 
 
Although a detailed discussion of the interpretation of the concept "in the course and 
scope of employment" in the context of an employer's liability for the wrongful acts of 
its employees is beyond the scope of this article, it is nevertheless noteworthy that 
the Constitutional Court in K v Minister of Safety and Security56 felt it appropriate, in 
the light of  constitutional imperatives, to expand and develop the common law of 
vicarious liability so that it "is sufficiently flexible to incorporate not only constitutional 
norms, but other norms as well'.57 In this context the Constitutional Court 
emphasised the "pervasive normative effect of our Constitution" and the consequent 
obligation of courts to develop the common law so that it promotes the spirit, purport 
                                                          
 
56  K v Minister of Safety and Security 2005 8 BLLR 749 (CC). 
57  See F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 SA 536 (CC). 
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and objects of the Constitution in terms of section 39(2) of the Constitution.58 A 
person's right to dignity is important in this context. In this case three policemen in 
turn raped a young woman who had gone to them for protection. The Court held that 
although the police officers' actions were obviously a clear deviation from their duty, 
there was a sufficiently close relationship between their employment and the 
wrongful conduct to hold the Minister of Safety and Security liable.  
 
In Grobler v Naspers Bpk59 the court found the employer vicariously liable for the 
acts of sexual harassment committed by a manager. The victim was his secretary. 
After considering the development of the doctrine of vicarious liability in other 
common law jurisdictions, the court concluded that policy considerations justified its 
finding.60 The court held that in order to establish the vicarious liability of the 
employer, there must be a "significant relationship" between the unlawful conduct 
and the creation or increase of the risk which was caused by the employer. Factors 
that were taken into account to establish this relationship included the harasser's 
ability to abuse his position of authority at the workplace as a result of the ambit of 
authority given to him by the employer, and the vulnerability of the harassed 
employee as a result of the harasser's position of authority. In this context the court 
considered the working relationship between a manager and his secretary to be one 
that increases the risk of the sexual harassment of the secretary. The court also took 
into account the fact that the manager had a close relationship with and considerable 
influence on the managing director. As a result of this he was in a position to 
influence his subordinate's careers by ensuring failure if they did not abide by his 
sexual demands and success if they did.  
 
It is significant that the court stated that if it was incorrect in finding the employer 
vicariously liable, then the existing rule of vicarious liability was not sufficiently 
flexible to deal with the problems of sexual harassment in the workplace. In this 
case, the court thought, courts would be obliged in terms of the Constitution to 
                                                          
58  F v Minister of Safety and Security 2012 1 SA 536 (CC) para 15. 
59  Grobler v Naspers Bpk 2004 25 ILJ 439 (C). See also Farhana v Open Learning Systems 
Education Trust (Unreported Labour Court Case No JS347/10, 20 April 2011) and Gauteng 
Shared Services Centre v Samai (Unreported Labour Appeal Court Case No JA44/09, 7 
December 2011). 
60  A thorough discussion of the reasoning of the court is beyond the scope of this article. 
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develop or adapt the common law of vicarious liability in order to protect and develop 
the fundamental rights to personal dignity, to the freedom and security of person, 
and to the bodily and psychological integrity of women in the workplace.61 As seen 
above, the Constitutional Court later adopted this same stance in K v Minister of 
Safety and Security. 
 
The court also held that an employer can escape liability by proving that reasonable 
care was taken to prevent harassment and to correct any such harassment 
immediately, and that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to avail herself of 
any preventative, or unreasonably failed to prevent harm.62 This is significant 
because the statutory provision providing for the vicarious liability of an employer 
provides a similar escape route for the employer. Section 60 of the EEA provides 
inter alia that if an employer directly encourages or even by its inaction allows or 
condones conduct which is in breach of the EEA,63 it will be vicariously liable for the 
damages flowing from such a breach. It reads as follows: 
 
(1) If it is alleged that an employee, while at work, contravened a provision of this 
Act, or engaged in any conduct that, if engaged in by that employee's employer, 
would constitute a contravention of a provision of this Act, the alleged conduct must 
immediately be brought to the attention of the employer. 
(2) The employer must consult all relevant parties and must take the necessary 
steps to eliminate the alleged conduct and comply with the provisions of this Act. 
(3) If the employer fails to take the necessary steps referred to in subsection (2), 
and it is proved that the employee has contravened the relevant provision, the 
employer must be deemed also to have contravened that provision. 
(4) Despite subsection (3), an employer is not liable for the conduct of an employee 
if that employer is able to prove that it did all that was reasonably practicable to 
ensure that the employee would not act in contravention of this Act. 
 
                                                          
61  Gauteng Shared Services Centre v Samai (Unreported Labour Appeal Court Case No JA44/09, 7 
December 2011) 514 C-H. 
62  Gauteng Shared Services Centre v Samai (Unreported Labour Appeal Court Case No JA44/09, 7 
December 2011) 495 G-H. 
63  Section 6(1) of the EEA prohibits discrimination in the following terms: "No person may unfairly 
discriminate, directly or indirectly, against an employee, in any employment policy or practice, on 
one or more grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, family 
responsibility, ethnic or social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, HIV 
status, conscience, belief, political opinion, culture, language and birth". S 6(3) prohibits 
harassment in the following terms: "Harassment of an employee is a form of unfair discrimination 
and is prohibited on any one, or a combination of grounds of unfair discrimination listed in 
subsection (1)". 
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This section was invoked in Ntsabo v Real Security CC.64 Ntsabo, a security guard, 
resigned after being sexually harassed by her supervisor. The employer, despite 
having been informed of the incidents of sexual harassment, consistently ignored the 
situation and in a complacent manner did nothing about it. The victim of the sexual 
harassment consequently resigned. The Labour Court found that the employer's 
inaction and complacency with regard to the situation had rendered it intolerable for 
Ntsabo to continue working and consequently Ntsabo was found to have been 
constructively dismissed in terms of the LRA.65 The basis of the constructive 
dismissal was sexual harassment. Sexual harassment is not one of the prohibited 
grounds of discrimination listed in section 187(f) of the LRA, and it qualifies as a 
ground for discrimination in terms of section 6(3) of the EEA only. In consequence 
the court per Pillay J was unable to find that the dismissal was an automatically 
unfair dismissal in terms of section 187(f) of the LRA, which attracts compensation of 
up to 24 months salary. Nevertheless the inaction of the employer was still found to 
constitute an unfair dismissal in terms of section 186(1)(e) of the LRA. The court 
made the maximum allowable award compensation for an unfair dismissal which is 
not an automatically unfair dismissal. This amounts to twelve month's salary,66 which 
in this case amounted to R12 000. 
 
The same inaction of the employer resulted in a further two awards for 
compensation. Section 50(1)(d) and (e) of the EEA provide that the Labour Court 
may make any appropriate order including awarding compensation and damages "in 
circumstances contemplated in this Act". Section 50(2) of the EEA further provides 
that if the Labour Court finds that an employee has been unfairly discriminated 
against, it may make "any order that is just and equitable in the circumstances, 
including- 
(a) payment of compensation by the employer to the employee; 
(b) payment of damages by the employer to the employee".67  
 
                                                          
64  Ntsabo v Real Security CC 2003 4 ILJ 2341 (LC). 
65  Section 186(1)(e) LRA. 
66  Section 194(1) LRA 
67  In Coetzer v Minister of Safety & Security 2003 24 ILJ 163 (LC) 306 the primary remedy for unfair 
discrimination was held to be what the court deems just and equitable.  
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The employer was ordered in terms of the EEA to pay a further amount of R20 000 
for future medical costs for psychiatric treatment and an amount of R50 000 for 
general damages including contumelia.68 In addition, the employer was ordered to 
pay for the costs of the application. Liability for future medical costs and general 
damages including contumelia was based on the statutory vicarious liability of the 
employer for the conduct of its employees created in terms of section 60 of the EEA.  
 
In Marsland v New Way Motor & Diesel Engineering69 the employee suffered a 
nervous breakdown as a result of his wife's leaving him during the December 
holidays. After hospitalisation for his breakdown, on his return to work, the employer, 
principally through the conduct of the managing director, placed the employee in a 
situation that rendered him incapable of doing his work. The employee was also so 
severely verbally abused, mainly by the managing director, that the court found the 
abuse to amount to a form of harassment. The court found that there had been a 
constructive dismissal and that the reason for the dismissal was unfair discrimination 
based on mental illness. The court found the dismissal to be automatically unfair on 
the basis of section 187(1)(f) of the LRA, which provides that a dismissal is 
automatically unfair if: 
 
... the employer unfairly discriminated against an employee, directly or indirectly, on 
any arbitrary ground, including, but not limited to race, gender, sex, ethnic or social 
origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, political 
opinion, culture, language, marital status or family responsibility.  
 
Mental illness is not one of the factors listed in section 187(1)(f) of the LRA. Despite 
this, Stein AJ found that since discrimination on the ground that a person suffers 
from a mental illness has the potential to infringe that person's dignity as a human 
being, such discrimination must be treated as discrimination on a prohibited 
ground.70 Section 6(1) of the EEA does not list mental illness as a prohibited ground 
for discrimination. Unlike section 187(1)(f) of the LRA, the words "on any arbitrary 
ground, including" do not precede the list of prohibited grounds. The listed prohibited 
grounds in the EEA, however, are preceded by the word "including". This indicates 
                                                          
68  This refers to non patrimonial damages suffered as a result of an injury to dignity, for example. 
69  Marsland v New Way Motor & Diesel Engineering 2009 30 ILJ 169 (LC). 
70  Marsland v New Way Motor & Diesel Engineering 2009 30 ILJ 169 (LC) 193E. 
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that the legislature did not intend to limit the grounds of discrimination to those listed 
in section 6(1). The decisive factor for a finding of discrimination in the Marsland 
case was that the basis for discrimination had the potential to impair the person's 
dignity as a human being. Since one of the purposes of the EEA "is to achieve equity 
in the workplace by promoting equal opportunity and fair treatment in employment 
through the elimination of unfair discrimination",71 it could be argued that all forms of 
discrimination that have the potential to impair a person's dignity, even if not on the 
basis of a listed ground, are prohibited by section 6(1) of the EEA. 
 
Therefore, conceivably Mr Marsland could claim that he was unfairly discriminated 
against by the managing director on the basis of mental illness and that this amounts 
to unfair discrimination in terms of section 6(1) of the EEA. In terms of section 60 of 
the EEA the employer could be held vicariously liable for this discrimination. As was 
the case in Ntsabo, Marsland would then be able to institute an action in terms of the 
EEA in addition to his claim for constructive dismissal in terms of the LRA. The 
difference between Ntsabo and Marsland is that the constructive dismissal in Ntsabo 
was not found to be automatically unfair. This could possibly result in a deduction of 
the compensation awarded as a result of the dismissal being automatically unfair 
from any compensation the Labour Court may award on the basis of section 60 of 
the EEA. 
 
In cases of unfair discrimination in terms of the EEA, the Labour Court can make an 
award that it deems to be just and equitable.72 There is no statutory limitation on the 
amount that can be awarded. Therefore, whether one's claim is based on unfair 
discrimination in terms of the EEA or on the common law (on the vicarious liability of 
the employer or on the duty to take reasonable care of the safety of employees), the 
ultimate outcome concerning the amount of compensation will be determined by the 
judge's sense of what is right and fair. Even though a judge will have the benefit of 
the opinions of expert witnesses concerning the extent of the injury, be it physical or 
psychological, as well as the results of calculations of actuaries, the fact remains that 
determining the amount of damages can never be an exact science. Inevitably there 
                                                          
71  Section 2(a) EEA. 
72  Section 50(2) EEA. 
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will always be an element of subjectivity in the final determination. Given the fact that 
unfair discrimination "undermines fundamental values that the labour relations 
community in our country depends on to regulate its very existence"73 it may be that 
the courts will impose punitive damages in severe cases of unfair discrimination that 
extend beyond pure financial loss. 
 
4 Conclusion 
 
The fact that an employment relationship is based at least partly on commercial 
considerations is evidenced by the fact that an employer is not only entitled to but 
even encouraged to make profits. A possible justification for legislative caps on the 
amount of compensation allowed for unfair dismissal may be the preservation of the 
interests of business efficiency and certainty. However, commercial viability can 
never be at the expense of a person's dignity;74 hence the notion that the 
employment relationship is relational. The interpretation of legislative and common 
law provisions must be undertaken against the backdrop of the fundamental 
constitutional guarantees inter alia of the right to fair labour practices and the rights 
to dignity and equality. 
 
This proposition is reflected in the law because in circumstances where an unfair  
dismissal also involves an impairment of one's dignity or discrimination, a disgruntled 
employee can avail himself/herself of the common law and/or certain provisions of 
the EEA where there are no limits imposed regarding the amount of compensation a 
court can award. If there has been unfair discrimination, the courts may even award 
punitive and non-pecuniary damages.  
                                                          
73  Per Nicholson JA in Chemical Energy Paper Printing Wood & Allied Workers Union v Glass & 
Aluminium 2000 CC 2002 23 ILJ 695 (LAC) para 48. 
74  In Whitehead v Woolworths (Pty) Ltd 1999 8 BLLR 862 (LC) para 32, the Labour Court held that 
in the light of the fundamental rights protected in terms of the Constitution, "the fairness or 
unfairness of the discrimination cannot be measured against the profitability or for that matter 
efficiency of a business enterprise". 
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